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Abstract 
Over the last several decades, policymakers have used tax policy to expand government social 
programs.   In typical social spending areas such as housing, healthcare, income security, 
commerce, and education; the federal government has increasingly used tax credits, 
exemptions, deductions, and exclusions as a means of delivering social benefits.  These tax 
expenditures are a more indirect means of provision than more traditional direct government 
outlays for agency implemented programs. Scholars have identified these indirect programs as 
making up a “submerged state” that disproportionately serves high income populations.  This 
paper examines whether there are racial disproportions between indirect and direct program 
types.   By focusing on programs that appear to have similar goals in the areas of housing, 
healthcare, and income security and using a chi-squared test for significance, I find 
concentrations of non-whites in direct programs and whites in indirect programs.  This finding 
has important public opinion, civic engagement, and equity implications and indicates an area 
of necessary further study.    
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“The federal income tax system consists really of two parts: one part comprises the structural 
provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and corporate net income; the 
second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which Governmental financial 
assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct 
Government expenditures. This second system is grafted on to the structure of the income tax 
proper; it has no basic relation to that structure and is not necessary to its operation. Instead, the 
system of tax expenditures provides a vast subsidy apparatus that uses the mechanics of the 
income tax as the method of paying the subsidies.” 
 
 Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, 1967 (Kleinbard, 
2008) 
 
"Keep your government hands off my Medicare." 
 
 Unknown town hall attendee as recalled by U.S. Rep Rober Inglis (R-SC)1 
  
I. Introduction 
Over the last several decades, policymakers have used tax policy to expand government 
social programs.   In typical social spending areas such as housing, healthcare, income security, 
commerce, and education, the federal government has increasingly used tax credits, 
exemptions, deductions, and exclusions, commonly called “tax expenditures” as a means of 
delivering benefits rather than more traditional outlays for agency implemented programs.  
Since 1974 the Joint Committee on Taxation and other federal bodies have tracked the fiscal 
impact of tax expenditures, and since the mid 1990s there has been a steady increase in the 
number of these items enacted by Congress (See Figure 1).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare! (n.d.). The Huffington Post. Retrieved April 18, 
2014, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamn-governme_b_252326.html 
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Figure 1: Number of Tax Expenditure Items Included in the US Tax Code 1987-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure from Joint Committee on Taxation (JCX, 2011) 
In this way, the federal government spends by failing to collect revenue through the tax code.   
Broadly these tax expenditures are a form of indirect social spending and I will refer to 
them as such throughout this paper.  This indirect spending is focused on areas of traditional 
social policy but benefit provision is not channeled through or does not require close interaction 
with an overseeing government agency, other than, in the case of tax-based spending, the 
Internal Revenue Service.   Additionally, the relative lack of visibility that characterizes tax 
expenditures is important. According to Suzanne Mettler (2011b), visibility of government 
programs is a function of both their familiarity to the public and whether the public can 
recognize those programs as government provided.   Programs that the public interacts with 
regularly, or sees policy makers or the media refer to; tend to be the most familiar.  Programs 
like welfare, Medicaid, and Medicare are examples.   Whether the public recognizes a program 
as government provided is different from their familiarity with that program.   Recognition can 
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be affected by the ideological point of view of the public; Mettler noted that more conservative 
program participants tended to be less likely to identify their use of a government program.  
For instance, while Medicare is a familiar program for many Americans, more than 25% of 
Medicare participants primarily interact with a contracted private insurance company.   This 
lack of interaction with a government entity tends to mask the role of government for these 
participants, perhaps resulting in the kind of quote that opened this paper (Mettler, 2011b).  
Policy design is the primary means by which tax policy is made invisible, according to Mettler, 
who uses the term “submerged state” to describe government spending that is concealed by 
provision through the tax code or subsidies.  This invisibility is serious as it results in an 
American public that cannot determine the size, scope, or beneficiaries of these policies and 
therefore cannot affect change in the related policy areas (Mettler, 2011b).     
     This finding highlights the need for the American public to expand their understanding 
of the mechanisms of social spending, but also begs a question. What do submerged programs 
have in common with each other? Mettler observes that tax expenditure programs 
predominantly serve high socioeconomic status Americans, while direct aid programs tend to 
be reserved for low income populations.  This would appear to make sense as itemizing 
deductions, a key manner by which tax benefits are disbursed, is typically more feasible for 
higher income tax filers.  However, low income status in the U.S. is not proportionally 
distributed; especially on the basis of race.  According to the 2012 Current Population Survey, 
Asians make up 11.7% of the people in poverty in the U.S. despite making up only 5.2% of the 
population, while African Americans and those of Hispanic origin (of any race) make up 27.2% 
and 25.6% of people in poverty, respectively, despite being only 12.8% and 17.0% of the 
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  Given the correlation between low income status and 
race in the United States, it seems reasonable to extend this analysis to examine the correlation 
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between race and submerged social policy.  Is there a correlation between the racial composition 
of program participants and whether an expenditure program is direct or indirect?  
The implications of such a finding are important.  Scholars have already noted links 
between public opinion and support for social programs on the basis of perceived racial 
composition.  If social programs that are the most visible are also those that disproportionately 
serve non-white populations, it is possible that there are effects on the public discourse about 
these programs2.  This could result in the public identifying certain racial groups as the 
predominant beneficiaries of social spending even if benefits are not so starkly distributed.  It 
could be the reason we see discussion of the “welfare queen,” a racial archetype used by Ronald 
Regan and others to describe those receiving AFDC benefits, and not “welfare corporations” or 
“welfare millionaires,” even though those groups receive significant social benefits.    I wish to 
first identify whether there are differences in the provision of social benefits along racial lines, 
and then make some conclusions about how these differences could result in 
mischaracterization of social program beneficiaries with resulting political implications.   
II. Literature Review 
Scholars in comparative analysis of US social spending have focused on issues such as 
the time period over which social programs were enacted and expanded, the mix of federal and 
state based programs, the public discourse about social spending, and the universal or targeted 
nature of the programs.  Over the last decade scholars have attempted to provide a more 
accurate picture of the size and scope of U.S. social policy by looking at the direct and indirect 
ways government spends money on citizens.  Rather than focusing on direct transfers to 
citizens, some scholars over the last decade have called attention government spending through 
                                                             
2 Non-white racial and ethnic categories per the U.S. Census including Black or African American, Asian, 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, “two or more races”, and “some 
other race”. 
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large and growing tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are defined as special tax credits, 
deductions, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential tax rates; in other words they are 
spending that the government does by giving up tax revenue in specific ways (GAO, 2012).  
These expenditures often cover similar areas as direct social spending: health, education, 
income security and housing, but differ in the indirect form the spending takes.   They represent 
a policy tool, a choice, which has increasingly been used by legislators in the last several 
decades to accomplish social goals in an indirect manner (Faricy, 2011).  For instance, the 2010 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), one of the largest pieces of legislation during the decade, was 
notably linked to the tax code through subsidies administered through a participant’s annual 
tax return.   Under the ACA, participants that enroll in health coverage through a health 
exchange may receive a subsidy to pay for coverage which is reconciled through their tax filing. 
The “premium tax credit” reduces the participant’s tax liability or is refundable if the credit 
exceeds the liability.  The reason that lawmakers may be increasingly using tax expenditures is 
unclear; it could be for political feasibility or administrative efficiency or for the purpose of 
obscuring these policies.  As we will see, using tax policy as a means of conferring social 
benefits is not a neutral one; it is not a choice between equal effects and warrants examination.  
 
The Submerged State  
Christopher Howard’s 1999 and 2007 works, The Hidden Welfare State and The Welfare 
State Nobody Knows, examined the reach of American social programs by counting tax-based 
programs as welfare.   The debate about how to characterize the American welfare state 
continues, but whether we characterize these programs as welfare or not, tax policies that are 
targeted at common social issues like economic well being and income security are 
appropriately grouped, more broadly, into social policy (Faricy 2011).  My definition of social 
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policy is informed by RM Titmuss work on social policy and is comprised of government 
interventions that deal with specific economic and non-economic needs of citizens in an effort to 
increase their welfare (Titmuss, 1974).     
Contemporaries of Howard have examined the extent to which U.S. tax policy creates 
government transfers that expand the reach of social policy (Gottschalk 2000, Garfinkel 2006, 
Hacker 2002).  These important early works recognized tax expenditures as generally less 
transparent and termed them as “hidden” and “shadow” state activities (Gottschalk 2000, 
Howard 1999).  Susanne Mettler brought the term “submerged” into the lexicon to describe the 
lack of visibility and inertia that typically characterize these indirect expenditures.  Mettler 
examined several indirect programs from their nexus in the 20th century in her book The 
Submerged State, providing a basis for how these programs influence political activities.  These 
works lay the groundwork on which to examine the tax- based programs as social programs 
and provide a background on the submerged state. 
One of Mettler’s key findings was that the visibility of government programs appeared 
to vary based on the design of benefit provision.  For instance, one of the key data pieces in her 
book uses survey data from the 2008 Social and Government Issues and Participation Study. 
This survey tracks the opinions of Americans on whether or not they have participated in a 
particular government program and then asks them more specific questions about program 
participation. In many cases 40-60% of those surveyed stated that they had not participated in a 
government program, initially, and then indicated that they had used tax credits, student loans, 
tax deferred savings plan and other programs upon further questioning.  This phenomenon, 
people who have used government social program without realizing it, is observed in a greater 
percentage of respondents for tax expenditure programs than direct aid programs.  Mettler then 
links the lack of public knowledge about the scope and scale of these programs to their 
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entrenched nature and susceptibility to interest group influence (Mettler 2010). For Mettler 
these tax expenditure programs favor the wealthiest Americans, promote private actors, and 
create disparities primarily along income and class lines.   She concludes that these types of 
submerged policies drive inequality and create a “passive” electorate who also mistrust 
government without recognizing the benefits from the state (Mettler 2011).   These scholars have 
examined the scope and level of tax expenditures across income levels.  Given the 
disproportionate number of minorities in poverty in the U.S., talk of disparities across income 
and economic inequality often turn to race.  Therefore, an examination of the submerged state 
from this perspective is sure to reveal additional implications.    
 
Race and Social Spending 
Race and social spending have often been linked through the development of the U.S. 
welfare state. Jeff Manza (2000) identifies three areas in which race and social welfare spending 
have been examined; historical institutional analyses, the “class/race nexus”, and the impact of 
racial attitudes on policy preference.  In his review of race and social policy, Manza notes that 
scholars like Theda Skocpol and Robert Lieberman have developed institutional explanations 
for racial disparities in the welfare state. For instance, the structure of the political process and 
procedural rules, like the filibuster, alter which social policies are enacted.   Additionally, the 
design of social programs such as federal mandates or state control can create racial differences 
in experience.  The race/class nexus refers to the manner in which researchers have focused on 
the influence of class groups, like the southern planters class, to understand the direction and 
universality of social policy.  Lastly, and most importantly for this work, scholars have 
considered public opinion and support for social spending that predominately targets certain 
racial groups.  Identifying a low level of support for programs targeted at African-Americans, 
researchers have come up with a variety of explanations from self-interest on the part of whites, 
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to racial attitudes, to the effect of policy goals that focus on either “opportunity” or “outcomes” 
(Bobo and Klugel, 1993).  Manza takes issue with the fact that many scholars do not provide a 
mechanism by which whites perceive certain welfare programs as predominantly benefiting 
African Americans even though the majority of beneficiaries are white.  In the racial attitude 
area, scholars like Martin Gilens (1995) use survey data to identify negative attitudes towards 
African Americans as a potential source of opposition to social programs.  Additionally, 
researchers have found that racial concentration within a state appears to have an impact on 
policy choices.  In their work on the 1996 welfare reforms, Joe Soss, et al (2001) note that states 
with higher percentages of African-Americans in their Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) caseloads adopted more restrictive policies.  While this study looked at state 
level programs and doesn’t provide a means by which race affected policy differences, the work 
reinforces the idea that race matters in policy formation and implementation.  
Public Opinion and Social Spending 
Digging in to how race and the submerged state might be linked, political scientists have 
also begun to examine the connection between indirect spending and public opinion.  While 
prior research has found a link between the amount of direct spending and public opinion, 
more recent arguments look at the influence of indirect spending on public opinion to provide a 
more comprehensive view.  Christopher Ellis and Christopher Faricy’s 2011 paper in the Journal 
of Politics find that direct and indirect spending differ not only on their visibility, but on their 
redistributive effects, the demographics of the populations served, and their impact on the 
private market.  With this is mind, direct and indirect spending should reasonably be expected 
to have variable impacts on public opinion.  Building on existing models of public 
responsiveness, Ellis and Faricy conduct a statistical analysis of existing survey data to measure 
the effect of changes in direct (federal spending on budgeted social programs) and indirect 
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spending (tax expenditures)  on the ideologically leanings (liberal or conservative) of aggregate 
public opinion.  They find that an increase in direct spending causes the general public mood to 
become more conservative while an increase in indirect spending causes the general public 
mood to become more liberal.  This difference is public response is perhaps reflective of 
differences in the public’s perception of the role of government under these spending types.  
Ellis and Faricy conclude that while indirect programs as less visible to the public, the public 
still appears to react to changes in spending.  What Ellis and Faricy fail to address is whether 
the public response to indirect spending is proportionate to the benefits conveyed and whether 
changes in public opinion result in policy action.  In a comparative analysis of developed 
countries, Jane Gingrich (2014) finds that in countries with more visible, direct programs 
citizens more often include welfare issues as an important voting issue.  The key idea is that the 
public gains information and reacts in different ways to indirect and direct programs.  These 
differences could be as a result of the visibility of these programs as Gingrich seems to contend 
or on ideological grounds as Ellis and Faricy suggest, but public opinion formation is affected 
by the indirect or direct provision of program benefits. 
An Area for Examination 
Scholars have not yet linked public opinion on social spending and race and made 
conclusions about what racial concentrations across the constellation of direct and indirect 
social spending might mean for public opinion.  Given the above discussion, public opinion 
could be an important way submerged state policies, direct policies, and race are connected.   
While the submerged state renders certain social spending invisible, obstructing public 
engagement and opinion, it has the opposite impact on direct social spending.  To the extent 
that direct and indirect social spending is targeted at different racial groups the impact on 
public opinion could occur along racial lines.  For instance, if direct spending is directed at 
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racial concentrations of non-whites, the comparative visibility of direct programs could be the 
means by which the public perceives that the government confers social benefits predominantly 
to non-whites.  At the same time, if indirect programs are predominantly directed at whites, the 
comparative lack of visibility in these programs could also contribute to public perception that 
social benefits are reserved for non-whites.  To examine this issue, I first seek to establish an 
account of racial concentration across direct and indirect social spending.   My hypothesis is 
that there are disproportionate concentrations of whites in indirect social spending programs 
and disproportionate concentrations of non-whites in direct spending programs. To examine 
this hypothesis I will look at social programs that appear to address the same social goals but 
differ in their method of benefit provision.  I will then determine the racial composition of 
beneficiaries which will allow me to make some conclusions about the viability and 
implications of my hypothesis.  Lastly, I will highlight areas in which additional data and 
research is needed. 
III. Background: Indirect and Direct Social Programs 
Definitions  
As I have done already, within this work I will refer to tax expenditures in a broad 
category of indirect programs.  These are programs that are designed to not be administered or 
overseen by a mission specific, dedicated government agency.  Tax expenditures are made up of 
variety benefits that American individuals, families, and businesses can access through 
additions to or omissions from their tax fillings.  The tax code sets up certain rules for what is 
considered income and what is subject to taxation.  Tax expenditures are broadly defined as any 
items that makes special exception from these normal rules (Surrey and McDaniel, 1978).  
Figure 2 provides a list of these types of exceptions.  Tax filings are made on an individual or 
family basis and therefore are subject to limited administrative data keeping and limited public 
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availability. The IRS does not collect more data on filers than is necessary for tax administration.  
In addition many tax expenditures are not required to be recorded on a tax return or may be 
aggregated with other items limiting both the visibility to the user and the tracking of their use 
(GAO, 2013).     
 Figure 2: Types of Tax Expenditures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GAO, 2012 
 
The primary source for the scope and amount of these expenditures is estimations made by a 
committee of the US Congress.  The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), a nonpartisan 
committee, assists Congress in enacting tax-related legislation.  On an almost annual basis, the 
staff of the committee produces estimates of Federal tax expenditures as a result of legislation 
passed by Congress.  JCT defines tax expenditures as “reductions in income tax liabilities that 
result from special tax provision or regulations that provide tax benefits to particular 
taxpayers.” In its definition, JCT notes that these expenditures often seek the same objectives as 
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direct outlay programs (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2014).   This definition shares the view of 
tax expenditures laid out in1967 by former Treasury official Stanley Surrey, who was one of the 
leading proponents measuring their impact.  JCT provides estimates of tax expenditures by 
budget function (i.e. specific credits or amortization provisions) and also groups these items 
into larger categories (i.e. Defense, Income security, Community Development).  These 
estimates are generally calculated by calculating the tax liability with and without a special tax 
provision and determining the difference.  The JCT may not include estimation of tax 
expenditure for budget functions determined to be too small (<$50M) and for those for which 
data is not available.  Based on JCT estimates, 2012 tax expenditures were about $986 billion.  
The largest tax expenditures, based on JCT estimations, are included in Figure 3.   
Figure 3: Ten Largest Tax Expenditure Functions, 2012 (in billions) 
Category Function Expenditure 
Health Exclusion of employer contributions for health 
care, health insurance premiums, and long-term 
care insurance premiums 
 
$117.3 
Commerce and Housing Reduced rates of tax on dividends and long-term 
capital gains 
$108.4 
Commerce and Housing Deduction for mortgage interest on owner-occupied 
residences 
$68.5 
Income Security Earned income credit $59.0 
Education, Training, Employment, and 
Social Security 
Credit for children under age 17 $56.8 
Income Security Defined contribution plans $49.6 
General Purpose Fiscal Assistance  Deduction of non business State and local 
government income taxes, sales taxes, and personal 
property taxes  
$43.5 
Income Security Defined benefit plans $40.9 
Commerce and Housing Exclusion of capital gains at death $37.8 
Education, Training, Employment, and 
Social Security 
Exclusion of benefits provided under cafeteria 
plans 
$26.8 
Source: Author Created based on JCT Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures For Fiscal Years 2012-2017 
  
Direct programs as defined within this work are those budget items that represent 
payments for social programs that are not tied to the tax code.  These can be thought of as more 
traditional government service programs that cover a variety of areas related to the general 
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welfare of the populace.  These programs are often means-tested, meaning that they provide 
benefits to low income or low asset individuals, but can also serve a broader population 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2014).  Direct outlay items are segregated from the larger budget 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and reported on an annual basis.  These 
outlays are reported as “payments for individuals” and comprise cash paid directly to 
individuals and families, the cost of services provided directly to them, and payments made to 
state governments by the federal government to support these programs.   The ten largest of 
these outlays are included in Figure 4.  For context, other outlays by the federal government 
that are not considered “payment for individuals” are payments of net interest, nondefense 
grants to state and local governments, like highway trust funds,  and federal loan and foreign 
assistance funds (The Office of Management and Budget, 2014). Based on OMB calculations for 
2012, outlays for individuals add up to about $2.30 Trillion and are about 65% of federal 
government outlays.    
Figure 4: Ten Largest Direct Outlay Federal Government Programs, 2012 (in billions) 
Category Function Expenditure 
Income Security Social Security: Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance 
 
$631.3 
Health Medicare: Supplementary medical insurance $288.2 
Health Medicare: Hospital Insurance $261.6 
Health Medicaid $250.5 
Income Security Social Security: Disability Insurance $135.7 
Income Security Unemployment Assistance $92.2 
Income Security SNAP (formerly Food Stamps) $80.4 
Federal Employees Civil Service Retirement $50.5 
Commerce and Housing Earned Income Tax Credit $54.9 
Military  Veterans service-connected compensation $48.8 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 2012. 
OMB also includes the Earned Income Tax Credit and the refundable portion of the 
Child Tax Credit as payments for individuals even though these programs are administered 
through the tax code.  This is likely because these are refundable credits and typically represent 
15 
 
a transfer to individuals and families.  For purposes of discussion in this paper, since the Earned 
Income Credit is included in JCT estimates as a tax expenditure item and requires an individual 
or family to file a tax return to receive the benefit, it will be classified as an indirect program. 
IV. Methodology  
I will examine the racial concentration of government expenditures that appear to have 
the same social goals but differ in their direct or indirect provision.  As such I will choose 
programs and spending in certain social areas and analyze data on the demographic 
characteristics of participants.  Social spending programs are often designed and administered 
at a federal level and therefore provide a breadth of programs to study.  As an initial 
investigation in this area, my examination will remain at the federal level.   In addition, a 
portion of social spending is composed of expenditures and programs that exist to address the 
needs of a specific sub population and have features designed for those needs.  For example, 
spending for the elderly and veterans are available at retirement or through enlisting and 
serving in the armed services.  This social spending is not available to most Americans for the 
majority of their lives.  While the demographic differences in these areas are important to 
consider, I seek to examine the programs available to non-disabled, working age individuals.   
This spending, both direct and indirect, are more widely available to the general public and 
provide a basis for comparison and some generality.  In addition, this spending is targeted at 
groups that that society would normal expect to support themselves through work.  This area of 
investigation recognizes that, given their ability to work, social provision for this group often 
becomes controversial and contentious; in that contentiousness it attempts to find the effect and 
influence of race.  Lastly, these federally administered programs are those for which data can 
more feasibly be obtained.   
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Ideally, I would be able to examine the entire system of federal social provision for the 
non-disabled and determine direct and indirect program provision and make conclusions about 
the demographic makeup of participants.  Constraints on both resources and available 
government data (which will be addressed in the recommendations) make this impossible.  To 
provide a picture of the relationship between social provision and race then requires a more 
selective examination.   I have selected social spending in three areas that are most readily 
available to non-disabled adults: health, income security, and housing.   I have chosen two 
social spending programs in each area, one indirect and one direct to analyze.   
Again, the important idea here is that if the social goals of these programs are the same 
then differences in the type of provision by race of participants is particularly interesting. I 
summarize participant racial data for each program by major racial and ethnicity groups, as 
defined in the U.S. Census (i.e. White, Black or African American etc.3), and further group into 
white and non-white groups.  To determine whether a racial concentration is present, I look at 
the program expenditure level and determine whether white and non-white benefits or 
participation differ significantly in the program based on comparison to a reference point.  A 
reference point is often used in studies of racial disparity as a definition of what is generally 
expected or normal and it provides a means of determining the size of a disparity.   As these 
expenditure programs are widely available to the US public, I will use the racial composition of 
the US public as a reference point to determine whether white or non-whites are significantly 
concentrated within a program (see Figure 5).   
 
                                                             
3 Racial and ethnicity categories included: White alone, not Hispanic or Latino; Black or African American 
alone, not Hispanic or Latino; Asian alone, not Hispanic or Latino; American Indian and Alaska Native 
alone, not Hispanic or Latino; Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, not Hispanic or Latino; 
Some other race, not Hispanic or Latino, Two or more races, not Hispanic or Latino; Hispanic or Latino 
(of any race). 
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Figure 5: Racial composition of the U.S. Population 
Race or 
ethnicity 
White Non-White  
Percent of 
U.S. 
Population 
63.75% 
Black or 
African 
American 
Hispanic Asian 
American 
Indian and 
Alaska 
Native 
Hawaiian 
and Other 
Pacific 
Islander 
Some 
other 
race or 
Two 
or 
more 
12.21% 16.35% 4.69% .73% .16% 2.13% 
Source: U.S. Census, CPS 2012   
 I use a Chi-squared goodness of fit test to determine the significance of any difference 
observed (Balakrishnan et al.,2013).  A Chi-squared, goodness of fit test allows for the 
comparison of an observed categorical characteristic in a sample population to a hypothesized 
underlying distribution.  For instance, I expect the race of program participants or dollars of 
expenditure by participant to mirror the racial composition of the US population, therefore, for 
a given the racial composition of participants in a program, Chi-squared allows a comparison to 
total US population.  In essence the Chi-squared test allows us to determine if program 
participants (observed) are pulled randomly from the US racial distribution (expected) or if 
there is significant concentration by race that indicates that the underlying, program participant 
distribution differs.  Chi-squared is particularly suited in this case given that I am dealing with 
categorical variables and a large sample size (which in some cases is the entire population of 
values). The Chi-square statistic has formula: 
   ∑
(   ) 
 
 
   
 
                                  DF = k-1 
Where O represents an observed amount, E is an expected amount, and k is the number of types 
of the categorical variable.  The resulting Chi-square statistic is compared to a Chi-squared table 
18 
 
which reflects the probability of the test statistic based on degrees of freedom, k-1.  In this study 
the categorical variable of interest is racial group, white or non-white.  To be clear, this does not 
mean that the racial composition or expenditure in each program should be the same as that of 
the U.S. population; it simply provides a means of determining whether there is a particular 
racial concentration within program or expenditure area.   
The Chi-squared goodness of fit test carried out here is based on the assumption of the 
Bernoulli Distribution, with probability of the participation of subgroups mirroring the census 
proportion of whites and non-whites in the nation.   If the Bernoulli distribution concentrates on 
“White” as “success” and “non-whites” as “failure”, as required in the language governing 
random bivariate outcomes that would be expected in a Bernoulli experiment, then the table 
below states the hypothesized distribution being tested under the Chi-squared goodness of fit 
theory: 
Table 1 
Groups Assumed probability of 
participation 
White (“success”) 0.6375 
Non-white (“failure”) 0.3625 
 
When the test is significant, then this particular Bernoulli model is excluded, without excluding 
other Bernoulli models. 
Based on racial concentration identified within expenditure programs areas (health, 
income security and housing), I make conclusions about the presence of concentrations in either 
the direct or indirect expenditure type by race.   
Programs Selected 
With these methodological considerations in mind, I selected programs in the three 
policy areas to examine: housing, health, and income security (See Figure 6).  I will examine the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and major Housing Assistance programs in the housing 
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policy area.  In the healthcare area, I will examine the Medicaid program as well as the tax 
subsidy for employer sponsored healthcare and.  In the income security area, I will consider 
direct programs TANF and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and 
indirect program, the Earned Income Tax Credit(EITC).   
Figure 6: Analysis Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarized in Figure 7, the selected programs represent about $271 billion in tax 
expenditures and $391 billion in direct outlays based on 2012 estimates and represent programs 
predominantly covering able bodied adults.   
 
 
 
Housing 
Income 
Security 
Indirect 
Housing 
Health 
Income 
Security 
Direct Indirect 
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Figure 7: Selected Programs and 2012 Expenditures and Outlays 
Program Name or Description Program Type Expenditure or Outlay Amount 
in Billions of Dollars 
SNAP Direct $80.4 
TANF Direct $20.1 
Earned Income Credit Indirect $59.7 
Housing Assistance Direct $40.0 
Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction 
Indirect $83.7 
Medicaid Direct $250.5 
Exclusion of employer 
contributions for health care 
Indirect $117.3 
 
 
V. Data 
Several kinds of data are needed to conduct this analysis.  Program expenditure data 
was gathered from JCT and OMB estimates and calculations.  Program participant data is then 
needed in order to determine the racial characteristics of those participants.  For each program 
this information may come from a range of sources, as reporting of racial demographic data 
may not be mandated under the program provisions (See Figure 8 for a summary of data 
sources).  As such, composite data was created in some cases to link datasets with information 
on racial composition to those with information on program participation and beneficiaries.   
Census data 
The U.S. Census Bureau compiles data on program participation in a number of 
programs.  This data is typically at a national level with information reported in numbers of 
thousands of people in particular programs and racial demographic data included.  
Additionally, data on racial composition was utilized from the 2010 U.S. Census. 
Zip code level data 
As participation in indirect, tax expenditure programs is done through the voluntary 
claiming of tax benefits on an individual’s tax return, there is comparatively little data currently 
compiled on racial characteristics of program participants.  However, as a proxy for racial data, 
I will examine claim amounts and racial data by zip code.  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
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reports Statistics of Income (SOI) data, which represent the amounts reported and claimed 
through individual income tax returns by zip code.  This represents the smallest geographic 
region on which this data is available.  The Census Bureau reports racial group data for the 
population by zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs) which closely match zip codes4.  By matching 
SOI data with ZCTA data on the racial composition, I created a database of the amount claimed 
of selected tax benefits.  I was able to use this compiled data, with a line item for each of the 
more that 27,000 US zip codes, to look for patterns estimated tax benefit by the racial 
composition of a zip code.  
Other Data 
Related agencies sometimes collect demographic information on program participants.  
As this information comes directly from the agency administering the program, the data can be 
considered a reliable estimate of racial compositions.  While this data is limited for certain 
programs it provides a reliable source for demographic information. In addition, my analysis 
will make reference to peer-reviewed studies that have examined or include program 
participant racial demographic data.  These studies serve as additional support for the findings 
of this paper.  
 Data Limitations 
There are several key data limitations that impact the analysis completed and inform the 
items for future study mentioned later in the paper.  First, ZCTA and zips codes are 
approximately the same but may differ in areas.  A ZCTA is made up of census blocks that 
reflect the USPS delivery routes defined as zip codes.  In some cases a zip code may not have 
ZCTA because very few addresses are present in the zip code.  For the majority of zip codes the 
ZCTA is a very close approximation and therefore the impact of missing ZCTAs is not expected 
                                                             
4 Census demographic data on race and age was utilized from Table QT-P1 of the Decennial US census 
from 2010 Census Summary File 1 
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to have a significant effect on the analysis.  As zip codes are the lowest geographic region at 
which the IRS collects data on certain tax benefits, ZCTAs are the most appropriate level of 
analysis.  Additionally, there are some restrictions on reporting in Census data and IRS data at 
the zip code level.  Both Census and IRS do not report data for persons they believe could be 
identified through reporting.  For instance, if there are few people in certain racial category in 
an area the Census will not include their information in its compiled data.   Accordingly, if a 
high income person could be identified within a zip code because they make up the vast 
majority of claimants the IRS will instead group their information in an alternate zip code, 
typically “99999.”  As this analysis groups by the large categories or white and non-white, I do 
not expect omissions in census data to be a large issue.   IRS data include in the 99999 zip code 
represented about 2% of the data obtained and therefore is not expected to have significant 
impact on the findings of the analysis.   
Additionally, census data utilized for demographic information was sourced from the 
2010 decennial census, while IRS data was the latest available and reflect all tax returns received 
between January 2012 and December 2012 and therefore predominantly reflect the 2011 tax 
year.  While the US population is a mobile one, it is not expected that racial concentrations 
within zip codes would have changed significantly between the 2010 census and the tax year 
reflected in the data.  Lastly, this analysis uses U.S. Census racial reporting.  Both the definition 
of the available racial groups and the self-reporting and data collection methods used by the US 
Census can lead to some data weakness, such as underreporting in low income areas or certain 
racial groups (Anderson and Fienberg, 2000).  This analysis relies on the underlying accuracy of 
census racial data.   
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Figure 8: Selected Program and Race Data Source  
Program Data Source 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Zip code level data 
Housing Assistance Agency Data  
Exclusion of employer contributions for 
health care 
Census Data  
Medicaid Census Data  
SNAP Agency Data  
TANF Agency Data 
Earned Income Tax Credit Zip code level data 
 
VI. Analysis 
Racial Concentrations in Housing Programs 
Federal and local governments have long been involved in the provision of adequate 
and affordable housing the in United States.  Whether by supporting financing or by regulating 
the construction and purchase of housing, there has been a government role in the housing 
market for over a century.  In the 1930s, the federal government created the Federal Housing 
Administration to insurer home mortgages in an effort to expand the private market for home 
loans.  This market expansion goal was continued in the 1970s and 1980s when Congress 
created quasi-governmental entities to serve as a secondary market for home loans (FHFAOIG, 
2014). Today, housing assistance spans several federal agencies in addition to state level aid and 
is comprised of more than 160 programs (including tax-based ones) (GAO, 2012).   While 
homeownership sometimes provides a significant wealth accumulation mechanism for 
Americans, the overarching goal in these programs appears to be to provide safe, affordable 
housing.  With that in mind, I will look at the largest housing tax expenditure program, the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID), which allows the tax deduction of interest paid on 
mortgage loans for a main residence or second home, and the three largest direct housing 
assistance programs administered by the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
24 
 
Development; the Housing Choice Voucher Program, Public Housing, and the Project-based 
Section 8 program (Internal Revenue Service, 2014; Rental Assistance/U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), 2014).  Each of these direct programs provides aid by subsidizing 
rent or providing dedicated low income housing.   
 The home mortgage interest deduction is in large part a remnant of the first income tax 
program enacted by Congress in 1913.  Lawmakers allowed the deductibility of all interest at 
this time and for decades afterwards.  Tax reform in the 1980s eliminated the deduction of most 
types of consumer interest but left deductibility intact for a few types of interest, including 
home mortgage interest.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the reasons for this 
exception; however, the implications of these provisions are paramount.   For homeowners that 
itemize their deductions, a process that is motivated by the attractiveness of the deductions 
available, the MID can provide a significant tax relief.  Under the MID interest paid on a 
qualifying mortgage is generally fully deductible.   
As noted above, income tax filing data is available on a zip code level.  Given that the 
MID can only be received by homeowners, this tax filing data in combination with census data 
on the race homeowners in a particular zip code provided the key racial concentration data. As I 
cannot look at filing data on an individual basis I focus on zip codes that are disproportionately 
white or non-white, first, to identify trends.  I present results for 80% or more white or non-
white zip codes in Figure 9.  See Appendix A for a sensitivity summary on these amounts 
reflecting alternate 70% and 90% white or non-white as concentrations.  Estimates of the total 
amount of mortgage interest dollars claimed in a zip code and the average amount per capita in 
a zip code show racial disproportions.   Zip codes that have predominantly white 
homeownership, 80% or more, represented 60.8% of the dollars of home mortgage interest 
25 
 
reported on tax returns despite those zip codes making up only 55.6% of the total population5.  
In addition, while zip codes that have predominantly non-white homeownership reported 3.3% 
of the dollars of home mortgage interest while making up 6.7% of the total population.  On a 
per homeowner basis, zip codes that are 80% white reported $4,497 MID and those that were 
80% non-white reported $3,724 MID.    
Figure 9: Home Mortgage Interest Reported by Race/Ethnicity, 2011 
For zip codes greater than 80%: White Non-white 
Total MID Reported  $214.9B $11.6B 
Per Homeowner MID reported  $4,497 $3,724 
Percent of total MID Reported6 60.76% 3.29%  
Percent of total population  55.96% 6.67% 
 
Turning to the Chi-squared analysis, we first assume that the racial distribution of MID 
within a zip code reflects the racial composition of the zip code based on census data.  This is a 
strong assumption but one that must be made to complete the analysis.  Given the income 
distribution by race, it is likely a conservative assumption for most zip codes.   
H0:  distribution follows the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial distribution of 
US (see above Table 1) 
H1:  distribution does not follow the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial 
distribution of US (see above Table 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 Note that this analysis focuses on the amount of home mortgage interest reported rather than the benefit received as 
it relies on the amount reported on the individual tax return.  It appears reasonable that as mortgage interest is fully 
deductible for qualifying homes, the reported amount should be proportional to the tax benefit received with the 
largest tax benefit for those in the highest tax brackets.   
6 Total MID reported on all returns per IRS SOI data is $353,685,194,000 
 Chi-Squared Results 
X2 31.4M 
DF 1 
P-value <0.001 
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According to this chi-squared analysis, with p-value < 0.001 there is a small chance that 
the distribution of MID expenditures matches the given proportionate racial distribution in the 
US.  We can, therefore, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is some level of racial 
concentration within the data.   
Based on this analysis, it appears that non-white populations receive less proportional 
benefit from this tax credit program that whites receive.  These findings are supported by the 
work of Beverly Moran of Vanderbilt University and William Whitford of the University Of 
Wisconsin Law School, whose 1996 paper on tax benefits by race concluded that on a number of 
home ownership related tax benefits blacks received less benefit even after controlling for 
income.  In the Arizona State Law Journal, Roberta F. Mann completes an analysis of the 
externalities of the MID including a summary of other scholarship indicating that benefits may 
be skewed away from non-white populations.   
 HUD administers major housing programs that demonstrate an inverse racial 
concentration relationship.  The tenant-based and-project based rental assistance programs 
commonly called “Section 8” are authorized under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.  While 
Congress has sought to modify these programs over time, the main programmatic elements 
include a rental subsidy to low income persons.  Housing Choice Vouchers provide tenant-
based rental subsidies to low income families for apartments found in the private market.  
Project-based Section 8 provides rental assistance for low income families who live in dedicated 
housing units or buildings.    The third major program is Public Housing.  HUD does not own 
or operate public housing but subsidizes the operating, capital, and some programmatic 
expenses for local public housing agencies which provide housing in various forms to low 
income, elderly, and disabled persons (HUD, 2014).  The tenant-based and project-based 
programs budget authority $16.2B and $9.1B, respectively, and the public housing programs 
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cost $11.1B which add up to about 90% of direct housing assistance outlays for individuals at 
the federal level.   
HUD’s Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS) provides access to administrative data from 
HUD’s internal automation system for tenant records.  It provides demographic data on a 
sample of head of households weighted for national representativeness.  Analysis of this 
administrative data reveals that for the weighted sample across housing programs minorities 
collectively are more likely to be served by HUD rental assistance programs than whites.  On 
average 36.6% of those served by these programs are white and 63.37% are non-white.  Figure 
10 provides a more detailed breakdown by program.   
 
Figure 10: Major housing assistance programs by race/ethnicity, 2011 
 White Non-white 
Housing Choice Voucher 34.5% 65.5% 
Public Housing 28.8% 71.2% 
Section 8 46.5% 53.4% 
Source: Author’s analysis of HUD Public Use Microdata Sample(PUMS) 
 
The Chi-squared test incorporates the Bernoulli distribution for each programs as above.   
H0:  distribution follows the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial distribution of 
US (see above Table 1) 
H1:  distribution does not follow the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial 
distribution of US (see above Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Squared Results Voucher Public Housing Section 8 
X2 5.7M 5.6M 1.1M 
DF 1 1 1 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
28 
 
According to this chi-squared analysis with p-value < 0.001 there is a small chance that 
the distribution of housing assistance expenditures matches the given racial distribution in the 
US.  We can, therefore, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is some level of racial 
concentration within the data.   
These findings are supported by other researchers in public housing who find racial 
concentration of minorities, particularly African Americans, in public housing projects (Carter, 
et al, 1998; Goering, et al, 1997; Hendrickson, 2002).  This analysis demonstrates a 
disproportionate number of minorities in a direct aid housing program and a greater proportion 
whites in a tax-based housing program.   
 
Racial Concentration in Healthcare Programs 
The United States system of healthcare is a mixed construction with private, public, 
regulated, and subsidized provision of health care and health coverage.  Government 
interaction with the health care system has been a large reason behind its current arrangement. 
Reforms enacted in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 will likely bring this interaction even closer.  
The ultimate goal across government provided and subsidized healthcare programs and the 
many experiments in provision of health services that have been enacted and maintained over 
the last century appears to be to provide affordable, accessible health care or insurance coverage 
to American citizens.  This common goal provides another apt area to examine racial 
concentrations in provision of social goods.   
The system of employer provided healthcare began in the twentieth century and was 
also largely unintended.   After Congress restricted employers ability to increase wages during 
WWII, private employers used benefit increases to attract and compensate employees.  The 
result was a growth in the provision of employer provided insurance.  After a 1954 ruling by 
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the IRS that these benefits could not be taxed as wages the modern system of deductions for 
employer provided health insurance premiums was facilitated (Blumenthal, 2006).  For 
employees this means a benefit that covers a great deal of a major expense and access to a group 
market rather than an individual health insurance market.  For the government, this deduction 
means the loss of tax revenue both in the form of reduced business taxes and the payroll taxes 
that would have been received through accounting for such benefits as wages.  Data on the 
impact of the deductibility of health insurance premiums comes from Census data on the 
number of people who receive employer provided health coverage (Figure 11) and JCT 
estimates of the magnitude of the revenue forgone which will be incorporated into the  chi-
square estimate. 
Figure 11: Employer provided healthcare by race/ethnicity, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of US Census Bureau data, Table HIB-1 
 
 On the direct side, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides payment and 
management of health care services for families, seniors, and those with disabilities.   Enacted in 
1965 as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty, Medicaid was first set up as a grant 
program for states to provide care to specific populations on a mean-tested or medical need 
basis.  At one time Medicaid eligibility was automatically provided to those qualifying for other 
cash assisted programs.  Additionally, Medicaid moved from reimbursing for the cost of care to 
a variety of providers to managing the care of participants (Brecher and Rose, 2013). While it 
started as a relatively small program it is now a major area of health spending for the U.S. and 
Program White 
 
Non-white 
Employer 
Provided  
69.7% 30.3% 
Percent of U.S. 
Population 
63.8% 36.3% 
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state governments.  According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the 
administrating agency, the program now serves 31 million children, 11 million non-disabled 
adults, 9 million individuals with disabilities and 4 million seniors (Medicaid.gov, 2014).  On a 
quarterly basis CMS releases estimates on the cost of Medicaid for the federal and state 
governments. Based on these estimates researchers have developed percentage of cost estimates 
for these major populations. According to these estimates, in 2010, 15% of Medicaid payments 
were made for non-disabled adults generally aged 18-64 (KFF, 2014). As this is the group of 
interest in this study, the data analysis incorporates this cost estimate.  
 
Figure 12: Medicaid health care participants by race/ethnicity, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of US Census Bureau data, Table HIB-1 
 
 
Looking at a chi-squared analysis and using a Bernoulli distribution, employer provided 
and the Medicaid program appear to have racial concentrations that can be considered 
significant. Non-whites disproportionately received Medicaid coverage while whites 
disproportionately obtain coverage through employment.   
 
 
 
 
 
Program White 
 
Non-white 
Medicaid 42.5% 57.5% 
Percent of U.S. 
Population 
63.0% 37.0% 
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H0:  distribution follows the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial distribution of 
US (see above Table 1) 
H1:  distribution does not follow the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial 
distribution of US (see above Table 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings are supported by the work of other researchers who have examined the source 
of health care coverage in the US population.  These studies also highlight some difference 
across non-white racial and ethnic groups.  Their findings include disproportionate coverage for 
whites in employer sponsored programs and a statistically significant difference in public 
coverage for non-white populations (Zuvekas & Taliaferro, 2003;  Brown, et al, 2000; 
Carrasquillo, et al., 1999) 
Racial Concentrations in Income Security Programs 
Income security is likely the classic way Americans think about social spending and the 
social safety net.  Just as in the housing area, income security programs span several federal 
agencies and state provision.  The overarching goal appears to be to provide a temporary stop-
gap of supplemental income to families to pay for essential items like food and other expenses.  
The three expenditure programs examined, TANF, SNAP, and the Earned Income Credit share 
this goal. 
Chi-Squared 
Results 
Employer 
Provided 
Healthcare 
Medicaid 
X2 199.8K 1.7M 
DF 1 1 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 
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The Earned Income Tax Credit, which began in 1975, provides a refundable tax credit to 
working parents (and a small amount to working single persons) based on income earned from 
wages, salary, and tips within certain income limits.  The credit is also increased on the basis of 
the number of qualifying children claimed by the tax filer, up to three children (EITC, 2014).  
Proponents of the EITC intended it to assist the working poor and to promote work to receive 
welfare benefits.  Over time, as reforms to traditional welfare programs were enacted, including 
time limits and work requirements, participation in those programs decreased while EITC used 
expanded (Ventry, 2000; Grogger, 2003).  Contributing often thousands of dollars to the yearly 
income of families the EITC is credited with pulling some families above the federal poverty 
guidelines.   
As a tax-based program, data is again available by zip code.  The program is 
predominantly used by families with qualifying children.    Therefore, I again focus on zip 
codes that are mostly white or non-white to identify patterns.  In Figure 13, I present findings 
for zip codes 80% or more white or non-white. See Appendix A for sensitivity analysis showing 
70% and 90% populations white or non-white.   Estimates of the total EITC dollars claims in a 
zip code predominantly white or non-white appears to show racial disproportions.  Zip codes 
that have mostly white individuals, 80% or more, reported 25.7% of EITC dollars while 
representing the residence of 37.3% of the total U.S. population.  Zip codes that were mostly 
non-white reported 21.7% of EITC dollars while making up only 11.1% of the total population.   
Figure 13: Earned Income Credit reported by race/ethnicity, 2011 
For zip codes greater than 80%: White Non-white 
Total EITC Reported  13.8B $11.7B 
Per Capita EITC Reported $119 $340 
Percent of total EITC Reported7 25.7% 21.7%  
Percent of total population  37.3% 11.1% 
 
                                                             
7 Total EITC reported on all returns per IRS SOI data is $53,674,924,000 
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The Chi-squared analysis confirms that the racial disproportion noted above is 
significant.   
H0:  distribution follows the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial distribution of 
US (see above Table 1) 
H1:  distribution does not follow the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial 
distribution of US (see above Table 1) 
 
 
 
.   
 
 
 
Non-white populations appear to receive more benefit from the EITC than their 
proportion of the population, while whites receive less than their proportional benefit.   There 
are few studies that directly focus on racial concentrations in the EITC program though several 
allude to EITC benefits disproportionately going to non-white households (Noonan, et al., 2007 ; 
Caputo, 2009). 
Direct aid for income security is found in the SNAP and TANF programs.  SNAP 
provides funds earmarked to augment food purchases for families and individuals meeting 
certain income guidelines.  Congress originally created the Food Stamp Program in 1939 and 
designed it to reallocate surplus food from the agriculture sector to those in need.  This origin, 
along with political considerations, account for inclusion of nutrition assistance legislation in 
the larger farm bill and administration by the US Department of Agriculture.  SNAP eligibility 
 Chi-Squared Results 
X2 34.3M 
DF 1 
P-value <0.001 
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is based on income, asset, or categorical eligibility.  Income guidelines are generally 130% of the 
Federal Poverty Line though some deductions and adjustments are permitted by law to 
calculate family income.  Additionally, those that receive cash assistance through TANF or 
other programs are automatically eligible for SNAP through categorical eligibility rules (SNAP, 
2013).  TANF began in its current form in 1996, when Congress passed the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and reformed the prior Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children program.   The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services administers a program of block grants to states who in turn manage programs that 
meet the goals of TANF legislation.   These goals include family structure, work, and income 
support for families with children.   
   Administrative data for the SNAP and TANF programs provide some insight into the 
racial composition of these programs.   
Figure 14: SNAP Participants by Race/Ethnicity, 2011 
Program White  Non-White Unknown 
SNAP  34.6% 44.8% 20.6% 
Percent of U.S. 
Population 
63.8% 36.6% N/A 
Source: USDA Agency Data. Characteristics of SNAP Program Households, FY 2012.  Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, 20148.   
 
Figure 15: TANF Participants by race/ethnicity, 2010 
 White or Caucasian Non-white 
TANF  30.1% 64.8% 
Percent of U.S. 
Population 
63.8% 36.3% 
Source: Office of Family Assistance, 2012 
                                                             
8 Agency data is incomplete as SNAP participants are not required to report race and ethnicity.  For 21% 
of recipients race or ethnicity is unknown.  However the author notes that inclusion of this data in any 
category would not change the noted racial concentration.   
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Both programs appear to have racial disproportionate non-white racial concentrations.  The 
Chi-squared analysis confirms that the racial disproportions are significant.   
H0:  distribution follows the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial distribution of 
US (see above Table 1) 
H1:  distribution does not follow the Bernoulli distribution based on proportionate racial 
distribution of US (see above Table 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the greater number of racial minorities in poverty in the U.S. it is unsurprising to find 
racial concentrations of non-white in these income security programs.  These findings are 
supported by researchers that have examined characteristics are associated with the likelihood 
of SNAP use and those that have predicted SNAP take-up in the adult population.   These 
studies note higher SNAP use amount non-white racial and ethnic groups (Rank and Hirschl, 
2005; Grieger and Danziger, 2011).  Researchers have also found race to be a significant 
predictor of TANF utilization.  While not the central finding of these studies, race appears to 
have an impact on both entry into the program and factors that would contribute to exiting the 
TANF program like finding stable employment (Gooden, 2000; Allard and Danziger, 2002). 
 
VII. Results and Implications 
I found racial concentrations in each social spending area.  The concentration in housing and 
healthcare programs are in the direction predicted; a disproportionate concentration of whites 
in indirect programs and non-whites in direct aid programs.   In the case of income security 
Chi-Squared 
Results 
SNAP TANF 
X2 9.0M 8.6M 
DF 1 1 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 
36 
 
programs, I found a disproportionate concentration of non-whites in both indirect and direct 
programs.  As these programs are aimed specifically at poverty alleviation we should expect 
these programs to reflect the disproportionate levels of poverty experienced by non-white 
populations in the US.  As such, these results are not unusual, especially as both direct and 
indirect programs exhibit racial concentrations of non-white persons.  In the case of health and 
housing areas, we are less well able to give explanation for the concentrations of whites in the 
indirect program and the non-whites in the direct program given that the common program 
goals are not income related and should not vary on the basis of race.   
The relative concentration on non-whites in direct programs and whites in indirect 
programs has several implications.  First, these findings open up questions on how and why 
programs that cover similar social spending areas came to be this way and to what extent these 
findings are prevalent throughout social spending.  It is unlikely that the causal story is exactly 
the same for each area, however, investigating the dynamics that create these differences in 
program provision may be valuable and may help identify other program areas in which this 
phenomenon occurs.  
As I mentioned earlier one of the key implications is for public opinion.  Scholars like Gilens 
and Bobo have already identified decreased support for programs that appear to serve minority 
groups. This work could identifying an important mechanism by which those racial attitudes 
are formed.  Non-whites are disproportionately in direct programs that are more visible to the 
public and therefore appear to be predominant beneficiaries of government social spending. 
This reduces public support for direct programs as racial attitudes scholarship would suggest.  
The visibility of the direct aid programs could serve as “correlational framing” for the general 
public, much in the way that Gilens noted that portrayals of African-Americans in media stories 
on poverty created a framework of association for the American public (Bobo and Charles, 
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2009).  At the same time, whites predominantly find themselves in indirect programs that are 
less visible to either themselves or the general public and therefore are not seen as beneficiaries 
of government spending.  This second effect works together with the racial attitude effect and 
could serve to amplify it. 
There are additional implications in how individuals view themselves and engage with and 
view government.  In Joe Soss’ interpretive work on the effects of program participation on the 
civic engagement of SSDI and TANF recipients, he found that features in the design and 
delivery of these programs affected participants feelings of personal agency and orientation 
towards government.   Direct interactions with government agencies serve as a mechanism for 
political learning that helps to shape participants views of government and their civic 
engagement.  For instance, through in-depth interviews and analysis, Soss connects TANF 
recipients’ experiences within the caseworker-client system, feelings of stigma, and negative 
views about other TANF program participants (Soss, 2005).  In addition, participants also 
appeared to form judgments on the responsiveness of government based on their experiences in 
these programs.  The result is that direct program experiences could hamper collective action 
and civic engagement.  It is unlikely that similar negative effects hold for indirect, tax 
expenditure programs.  Given these findings, it an important implication of this work is could 
be in differential impacts on the political engagement of whites and non-whites.  If non-whites 
are concentrated in programs that work to hamper their political action there could be wider 
effects on the political system.  Additionally, if whites are concentrated in programs that are 
indirect and less visible it appears possible that they are less likely to see themselves as 
beneficiaries of government spending and also cannot form judgments on the responsiveness or 
effectiveness of government despite participating in a government program.  This finding is 
consistent with Mettler’s hypothesis of decreased engagement due to indirect policy.    
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Lastly, achieving similar goals through separate programs, direct and indirect, presents 
equity implications.  The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, provides equal protection under the law.  This was the means by which 
“separate but equal” policies of the twentieth century were challenged (Lawrence, 1987).  The 
appearance of disproportions in program type should be of concern for similar reasons.  First, 
“equal” part of “separate but equal” has always been called into question and, given the 
political engagement implications already noted, the same critique holds.  Additionally, the 
racial concentrations noted by program type could be an indication of underlying structural 
forces of separation and discrimination that should be addressed.   
VIII. Conclusion and Recommendation  
This analysis sought to test a hypothesis of racial concentrations in direct and indirect 
programs.  By examining programs in three areas of social provision I found racial 
concentrations despite shared social goals in each program area.  The results presented here 
have important implications.  Scholars previously noted that submerged, indirect programs 
confer benefits on wealthier citizens while providing less transparency on who receives 
program benefits.  They had also found lower support for programs that appear to be race 
targeted on non-white populations.  I sought to bring race into this discussion of the submerged 
policies by first demonstrating that program provision in social policy areas is bifurcated 
between indirect and direct programs on the basis of race.  By identifying this distinction we 
can begin to see a mechanism by which public opinion, civic engagement, and support for social 
programs could be affected by social spending type.  These findings also raise important racial 
equity concerns.  While we know that non-whites are not greater government program 
participants in absolute terms, they may be more visible participants based on direct programs 
through which they receive social benefits.  Policymakers have increasingly used tax 
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expenditures as a means to confer social benefits.  Further expansion of the tax expenditure 
system not only reduces the visibility of government spending but could contribute to race 
related effects in a number of ways.  
The analysis conducted in this paper was hindered by a lack of comprehensive data on 
tax expenditure programs.  While information on direct aid program participants is typically 
readily available from a number of government agency and interest group sources, tax benefit 
recipients are not subject to the same level of scrutiny.  This finding alone is symptomatic of the 
issue of invisibility that characterizes indirect, tax expenditure programs.   
As the Government Accountability Office noted, in its 2013 report on the issue, insufficient data 
is available to evaluate who claims tax expenditures and the amount claimed9.  To promote 
transparency, Congress should instruct government agencies to track the use of tax 
expenditures to provide useful data on whom and how tax expenditures are used. This will 
provide valuable data for study.  The data available should be increased in both depth and 
breadth.   As currently reported many tax items are aggregated at a level that conceals the 
underlying policies.  For instance, itemized deductions are made up a number of different 
policies such as medical and dental deductions, charitable contributions, and business expenses.  
Despite the differing policy goals and implications these items are often reported in lump sum.  
Disaggregating these amounts will provide clarity on the amount of tax expenditure benefit in 
these areas.  Additionally, information on the identity of specific tax filers is not revealed for 
obvious privacy related reasons but the current aggregation of information at a zip code level is 
much too high level for much significant study. There are other options that would provide 
greater breadth of data to researchers.  For instance, the IRS could create a nationally 
representative sample of tax filers, based on key characteristics, much in the way that HUD 
                                                             
9 GAO-13-479, TAX EXPENDITURES: IRS Data Available for Evaluation Are Limited, 2013 
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creates the annual housing surveys that underlie its’ public use data sets.  This method of 
provision provides privacy to tax filers and information to those who seek to study the use of 
tax expenditures.  This information provides a vital way to continue to understand the 
implications of tax expenditures. 
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APPENDIX: Sensitivity of Zip Code Estimates of Tax Benefit 
 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 
 
 
Earned Income Tax Credit 
White 
percentage  
Amount EITC Percentage of 
Total EITC in 
zip 
Percentage of 
population in 
zip 
Per capita EITC Per zip 
EITC 
count 
of zips 
>70%                       
19,495,098  
36.32% 51.00%                                                                 
123  
                                     
981  
  
19,867  
>80%                                          
13,770,245  
25.65% 37.34%                                                                 
119  
                                     
795  
  
17,329  
>90%                                            
7,411,954  
13.81% 19.36%                                                                 
124  
                                     
542  
  
13,664  
  
White 
percentage 
Amount 
MID (in 
000s) 
Percentage 
of Total 
MID in zip 
Percentage of 
householders 
in zip 
Percentage of 
population in 
zip 
Per 
householder 
MID 
Per 
zip 
MID 
count 
of 
zips 
>70%                                       
264,531,871  
74.79% 75.71% 68.31%                                  
4,673  
    
12,276  
            
21,549  
>80%                                       
214,900,283  
60.76% 63.91% 55.96%                                  
4,497  
    
11,008  
            
19,523  
>90%                                       
126,457,326  
35.75% 42.74% 35.93%                                  
3,958  
      
7,887  
            
16,034  
Non -
White 
percentage  
Amount 
MID 
Percentage 
of Total 
MID in zip 
Percentage of 
householders 
in zip 
Percentage of 
population in 
zip 
Per capita 
MID 
Per 
zip 
MID 
count 
of 
zips 
>70%                                          
19,565,595  
5.53% 6.46% 10.05%                                  
4,053  
  
18,167  
               
1,077  
>80%                                          
11,634,895  
3.29% 4.18% 6.66%                                  
3,724  
  
16,693  
                  
697  
>90%                                            
5,438,479  
1.54% 2.14% 3.60%                                  
3,396  
  
14,426  
                  
377  
Non-white 
percentage  
Amount EITC Percentage of 
Total EITC in 
zip 
Percentage of 
population in 
zip 
Per capita EITC Per Zip 
EITC 
Count 
of Zips 
>70%                                          
15,763,953  
29.37% 15.90%                                                                 
320  
8,544 1,845 
>80%                                          
11,661,662  
21.73% 11.05%                                                                 
340  
9,606 1,214 
>90%                                            
6,785,158  
12.64% 5.91%                                                                 
370  
10,296 659 
